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In processing industries, plant location decisions are 
costly and have consequences for firm profitability. 
When raw materials are heavy or perishable, 
transportation costs limit shipping distances and 
processors must compete locally for raw material 
inputs. Adding a new processing plant in the 
procurement area will increase raw material demand, 
likely raising input price and decreasing profit for all 
processors in the area. Important to the entry decision 
is the expected magnitude of input price change. To 
determine the expected profitability of a new plant, a 
processor must forecast the effect entry will have on 
local post-entry raw material price. This requires 
anticipating how entry will affect market structure and 
intensify competition for raw materials. 
 
Through time and space, various numbers of 
processors can be observed competing for input supply 
within their procurement areas. These cross-sectional 
time-series variations potentially allow estimation of the 
relationship between number of processors competing 
for an input in a procurement area and the input price 
in that area. The probable effect on raw material price 
of a processor entering a procurement area can be 
inferred by contrasting procurement areas with n firms 
with those containing n+1 firms while controlling for 
differences between the procurement areas other than 
input price. The unique contribution of this study is 
development of a game-theoretic based empirical model 
that incorporates unique features typical of processing 
industries to forecast the magnitude of a raw material 
price response to processor entry. The method 




Model development in this paper is most closely related 
to that of Corbett and Karmarkar (2001), where 
downstream players base entry decisions on expected 
outcomes of post-entry Cournot competition. Rather 
than focusing on theory as they do, the emphasis here is 
on development of a forecasting model that can be 
used to predict likely impact of entry on input costs. 
This paper also differs from their work in its focus on 
downstream entry effects on upstream input prices. The 
empirical work in this paper draws from Bresnahan and 
Reiss (1990 and 1991) and Berry (1992), but differs 
from these in that it uses a specific game setting, 
focuses on input rather than output markets, enhances 
model information through use of prices, and provides 
an ex ante price forecasting approach for entry effects. 
 
The model is based on production technologies 
commonly observed in processing industries and is 
derived from game theory that explicitly accounts for 
processor competition in local input procurement areas.  
 
Input supply of fed beef is derived from feeder profit 








j is supplier j’s profit, w is fed cattle price, yj is 
cattle production for j, c(.) is variable cost assumed to 
be a normalized quadratic, v is a vector of variable 
factor prices (feeder steers, corn, farm inputs, and 
labor), lj is quasi-fixed capital (capacity) for j, and s is 
the price associated with lj.  
 
Packer profit is modeled as revenues less unit marginal 
cost for noncattle inputs and a price for the fed cattle 
input which permits exertion of monopsony market 
power by packers. Packers are assumed to have 
identical linear unit (marginal) cost, so C(μ; ki) is linear 








i is processor i’s profit, P is a vector of 
wholesale and byproduct prices for processor output, μ 
is a vector of prices for processor production factors 
associated with variable inputs other than cattle (e.g., 
labor, energy, and materials), e is a vector of ones 
conformable with β,and r is the price of quasi-fixed 
capital input (capacity), ki. 
 
Letting N be the number of packers in a supply area 
and solving for Cournot-Nash equilibrium in packer 
procurement results in the estimation equation: 
 
w = [P1 β1 + P2 β2 − (b0 + bμ μ + bk ki)  
      − aY v v – aY l l ] N/(1 + N) + a Y v v + a Y l l, 
 
where N is the number of processors competing in the 
procurement area, a’s and b’s are parameters, and other 
variables are defined above. 
 
Model Estimation and Data 
 
Estimation results are obtained for the 43 of the largest 
steer and heifer packing plants in the US.Supply areas 
are bounded by a 300-miles radius around the plant. 
Number of processors in each circle is N varying 
between 1 and 11 or more packers.  
 
Estimation results indicate that, with the exception of 
food processor wage, all estimated parameters have the 
expected signs. Further, with the exception of bk, all 
parameters are statistically significant. The insignificant 
parameter estimate for bk indicates that unit cost is not 





N   Price     Change in  Cumulative 
  ($/head)  Price (%)  Change in 
     P r i c e   ( % )  
1 690.17        
(7.15) 
2    727.74     37.57   37.57 
(4.35)     (3.87)   (3.87) 
3  746.53     18.78   56.35 
(3.43)   (1.93)   (5.80) 
4 757.80    11.27      67.62 
(3.47)   (1.16)   (6.96) 
5  765.31   7.51   75.14 
(3.70)   (0.77)   (7.74) 
6  770.68   5.37   80.51 
(3.94)   (0.55)   (8.29) 
7  774.70   4.03   84.53 
(4.17)   (0.41)   (8.70) 
8  777.83   3.13   87.66 
(4.37)   (0.32)   (9.71) 
9  780.34   2.50   90.17 
(4.53)   (0.26)   (9.28) 
10  782.39   2.05   93.22 
(4.67)   (0.21)   (9.50) 
11  744.10   1.71   93.92 







Theory predicts that when a processor enters a 
procurement area, total input supply rises, amount 
purchased by each processor falls, profit per processor 
falls, and raw material input price rises. Estimation 
results confirm that statistically significant higher 
equilibrium input prices are associated with larger 
numbers of processors competing in a procurement 
area. Further, theory predicts that as the number of 
buyers in a procurement area increases, the incremental 
effect that each additional buyer has on equilibrium 
price diminishes; the model correctly forecasts this 
expected response as well. Importantly, the model 
predicts the magnitudes of price increases likely to 
result from entry. Whether entry is a good business 
decision will depend upon how much processor profits 
fall with entry, which is can be computed from the 
expected input price rise.  
 
This method provides an approach for moving beyond 
the theoretical to evaluate both the direction and 
magnitude of price and profitability changes associated 
with downstream entry and provides enhanced 
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